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Casenote

The Taming of the "2": Milner v. Department
of the Navy Signals the Curtain Call on

Debates Surrounding the Scope of
FOIA's Exemption 2

"Old fashions please me best; I am not so nice / To change true rules
for odd inventions."'
- William Shakespeare
I.

INTRODUCTION

For more than three decades, federal courts have grappled with the
intended scope of Exemption 2 of the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA),2 which protects material "related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency" from mandatory public disclosure.
However, in Milner v. Department of the Navy,' the United States

1.

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TAMING OF THE SHREW act 3, sc. 1.

2.

5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006), amended by OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-

175, 121 Stat. 2524.
3. Id. § 552(b)(2).
4. 131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011) (abrogating Massey v. FBI, 3 F.3d 620 (2d Cir. 1993); Schiller
v. NLRB, 964 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Kaganove v. EPA, 856 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988);
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Supreme Court put an end to all conflicting postulations regarding the
precise boundaries of Exemption 2 by holding that military explosive
distance data does not qualify for agency withholding under the
exemption.' In its opinion, the Court declared that Exemption 2
encompasses records relating to employee relations and human resource
issues but does not extend to more substantial internal matters whose
disclosure would risk circumvention of the law.' As a result of the
Court's strict construction of the text of the exemption, Milner will likely
have a significant impact on federal agencies that previously relied on
Exemption 2 to withhold sensitive information not explicitly protected
by one of the FOIA's other existing statutory exemptions.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The story of Milner v. Department of the Navy8 begins in Puget
Sound, Washington, where the United States Navy maintains Naval
Magazine Indian Island (Indian Island). The Navy uses Indian Island
to store and transport weapons, ammunition, and explosives.? To aid
in its operations on the island, the Navy utilizes Explosive Safety
Quantity Distance (ESQD) information that prescribes "minimum
separation distances" for explosives."o ESQD information allows the
Navy to organize facilities in a manner that would prevent chain
reactions in the event of a detonation. ESQD information is also
occasionally employed to illustrate the hypothetical effects of an
explosion on the island.n
In 2003 and 2004, Glen Milner, a resident of Puget Sound, submitted
FOIA12 requests to obtain ESQD information concerning Indian
Island.'" Invoking FOIA!s Exemption 2" and Exemption 7,15 the

Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
5. Id. at 1271.
6. Id.
7. See id. (acknowledging that its decision "upsets three decades of agency practice
relying on [a broad interpretation of Exemption 2] and therefore may force considerable
adjustments").
8. 131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011).
9. Id. at 1263.
10. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. Id.
12. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006), amended by OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110175, 121 Stat. 2524.
13. Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1264.
14. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2).
15. Id. § 552(b)(7)(F). Specifically, the Navy invoked Exemption 7(F), Milner, 131 S.
Ct. at 1264, which protects from mandatory disclosure "records or information compiled for
law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such . .. records
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Navy denied Milner's request and refused to release the information,
declaring that disclosure of ESQD calculations would endanger both the
naval base and the surrounding community." Milner subsequently
filed a suit in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Washington to compel disclosure of the ESQD information." The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Navy under
Exemption 2 without addressing the question of whether the documents
could also be exempt under Exemption 718
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's grant of summary judgment." Relying on the "High
2"20 interpretation of Exemption 2, developed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco & Firearms,2 ' the Ninth Circuit held that personnel documents
may be withheld when the materials are predominantly internal and
disclosure presents a risk of circumvention of agency regulation.22
After determining that the ESQD information "is predominately used for
the internal purpose of instructing agency personnel on how to do their
jobs" 23 and that disclosure "would risk circumvention of the law" by
"point[ing] out the best targets for those bent of wreaking havoc,"24 the
court of appeals ultimately concluded that the ESQD information was
exempt from disclosure.2 5
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a
circuit split regarding the scope of Exemption 2.26 Adopting a narrow
view of Exemption 2, the Court held that ESQD information may not be
withheld as material "related solely to the internal personnel rules and
practices of an agency"27 because the information concerns neither
employee relations nor human resources issues. 2 8 In an 8-1 ruling, the

. . . could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual."
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F).
16. Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1264.
17. Milner v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, No. C06-01301-JCC, 2007 WL 3228049, at *1-2
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 30, 2007), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 1259.
18. Id. at *8.
19. Milner v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 575 F.3d 959, 961, 972 (9th Cir. 2009).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 65-66.
21. 670 F.2d 1051 (1981), abrogated by Milner, 131 S. Ct. 1259.
22. Milner, 575 F.3d at 968.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 971.
25. Id. at 972.
26. Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1264.
27. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2).
28. Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1271.
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Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the
case for further proceedings."
III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Freedom of InformationAct
Initially enacted in 1966, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)30
provides that all citizens have a judicially-enforceable right to access
federal agency records unless those records are protected from public
disclosure by one of nine statutory exemptions.31 At issue in Milner v.
Department of the Navy" is FOIA's Exemption 2," which insulates
from mandatory public disclosure records that are "related solely to the
internal personnel rules and practices of an agency."" Over the years,
the scope of this exemption has become the source of much debate: some
courts have interpreted the exemption's language broadly, while others
have taken a more narrow approach.
A great deal of the discussion surrounding the intended scope of these
twelve words can be traced back to the legislative history of FOIA.
Much confusion has arisen from the fact that the House3 6 and Senate37 reports, which accompanied the ratified act, differed significantly
in their proffered illustrations of the types of information that Exemp-

A.

29. Id.
30. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006), amended by OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110175, 121 Stat. 2524.
31. Id.
32. 131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011).
33. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2).
34. Id.
35. Compare Massey v. FBI, 3 F.3d 620, 622 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that Exemption 2
extends to information concerning "those rules and practices that affect the internal
workings of an agency") (internal quotation marks omitted), Kaganove v. EPA, 856 F.2d
884 (7th Cir. 1988) (exempting the EPA Rating Plan from mandatory disclosure where an
employer would reasonably expect the document to be internal and disclosure would
frustrate the document's objective) and Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms,
670 F.2d 1051, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that "if a document for which disclosure is
sought meets the test of 'predominant internality,' and if disclosure significantly risks
circumvention of agency regulations or statutes, then Exemption 2 exempts the material
from mandatory disclosure"), with Cox v. Levi, 592 F.2d 460, 462-63 (8th Cir. 1979)
(declaring that Exemption 2 protects only "housekeeping"matters); and Hawkes v. Internal
Revenue Serv., 467 F.2d 787, 797 (6th Cir. 1972) (stating that the plain language of
Exemption 2 relates only to "employee-employer type concerns").
36. H. REP. No. 89-1497 (1966), reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418.
37. S. REP. No. 89-813 (1965).
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While the Senate Report
tion 2 would be employed to protect."
rules and practices of an
personnel
declared that "lexamples of [internal
of parking facilities or
use
personnel's
to
agency] may be rules as
as to sick leave, and the
policy
of
regulations of lunch hours, statements
different interpretasignificantly
a
like,"" the House Report proffered
to the House
According
coverage.
tion of the exemption's intended
and
guidelines,
Report, Exemption 2 would cover "[olperating rules,
but
or
examiners"
investigators
manuals of procedure for Government
as
such
management'
internal
would not extend to "all 'matters of
administrative
employee relations and working conditions and routine
procedures."o Because Congress never reconciled the conflicting reports,
the judiciary was left with the arduous task of interpreting the reach of
Exemption 2's protection.
B. Rose and the Caveat Conundrum
The Supreme Court's first opportunity to evaluate the scope of
Exemption 2 and its conflicting legislative history came in 1976 with
Department of the Air Force v. Rose.41 In Rose, present and former
student law review editors brought an action under FOIA to compel
disclosure of case summaries from honor and ethics hearings at the
United States Air Force Academy.4 2 The United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York granted the Air Force's motion for
summary judgment, holding that the case summaries "related solely to
the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency" and were,
therefore, shielded from mandatory disclosure by Exemption 2. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, and the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.45 In a 5-3 opinion

38.
The Senate Report expressly states that documents concerning minor matters of
employment-like sick leave policy-are exempt from disclosure, whereas the House
Report indicates that such matters should be released. The so-called contradiction
between the House and Senate Reports, however, exists only with respect to the
exemption of trivial employment matters. The House Report's statement that
Exemption 2 permits exemption of more substantive matters-such as 'manuals of
procedure for Government investigators or examiners'-is uncontroverted by the
Senate Report.
Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1061.
39. S. REP. No. 89-813, quoted in Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1059.
40. H. REP. No. 89-1497, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2427.
41. 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
42. Id. at 354-55.
43. Id. at 357; 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2).
44. Rose, 425 U.S. at 356-57.
45. Id. at 357-58.
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delivered by Justice Brennan, the Court affirmed the decision of the
Second Circuit, holding that the requested documents were not exempt
from mandatory disclosure because they did not concern only routine
matters of merely internal significance and their disclosure would not
46
impose any particular administrative burden on the Air Force.
After briefly discussing the basic purpose of FOIA,47 the Court dove
into Exemption 2's legislative history.4 In its analysis, the Court noted
that most courts considering the discrepancies between the House and
Senate Reports have concluded that the Senate Report more accurately
Observing that the House Report
reflects congressional intention.
primarily focused on exempting disclosures that might enable regulated
personnel to circumvent agency regulationso and reiterating the Second
Circuit's determination that this was not a case in which knowledge of
administrative procedures might help outsiders to circumvent regulations or standards," the Court found the Senate Report to be more
authoritative."
Relying on the narrow approach of the Senate Report, the Court
interpreted Exemption 2 to protect internal agency matters so routine
or trivial that they could not be subject to a genuine and significant
public interest." The Court further declared that the general thrust
of Exemption 2 is to relieve agencies of the burden of assembling and
maintaining such information for public inspection. 4 However, the
Court's interpretation of Exemption 2's intended coverage carried an
important caveat: the Court's understanding of the exemption's scope
would govern "at least where the situation is not one where disclosure

46. Id. at 369-70.
47. "The basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the
functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the
governors accountable to the governed." NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S.
214, 242 (1978). Thus, FOIA reflects a "general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless
information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language." Rose, 425 U.S. at
360-61; S. Rep. No. 89-813.
48. Rose, 425 U.S. at 360-67.
49. Id. at 363 (citing Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699,703 (5th Cir. 1973); Hawkes, 467
F.2d at 796; Stern v. Richardson, 367 F. Supp. 1316, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Consumers
Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp. 796, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Benson v. GSA, 289 F. Supp. 590, 595 (W.D. Wash. 1968)) ("Almost all courts that have
considered the difference between the Reports have concluded that the Senate Report more
accurately reflects the congressional purpose.").
50. Id. at 366-67.
51. Id. at 364.
52. Id. at 367.
53. Id. at 369-70.
54. Id.
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Thus, the Court
may risk circumvention of agency regulation.",5
explicitly left open the question of whether Exemption 2 applies to
situations where disclosure may risk circumvention of agency regulation
and, more importantly, the possibility for future application of the House
Report's interpretation of the exemption.
The United States Supreme Court's (Not So Brief) Intermission
While the Supreme Court's ruling in Rose began to define the contours
of Exemption 2, the decision did not dispel all confusion, and it would be
thirty-five years before the Court would have another opportunity to
address the exemption's intended scope. Even before the Court's
decision in Rose, some circuits had determined that Exemption 2 protects
only internal matters of a relatively trivial nature." However, relying
on the Rose caveat, other circuits began applying Exemption 2 to more
substantial internal matters when disclosure would risk circumvention
of agency regulations.57
Five years after Rose, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia decided what would become the leading case on the
broadened interpretation of Exemption 2's coverage. In Crooker v.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms," the D.C. Circuit extensively
analyzed Exemption 2, examining the overall design of FOIA, its
legislative history, the Supreme Court's cautionary words in Rose, and
even "common sense," in order to determine the scope of the exemption." Ultimately, the court of appeals determined that if an agency
record is "predominately internal []" and its disclosure "significantly risks
circumvention of agency regulations or statutes," then Exemption 2
protects the material from mandatory disclosure.60
In the years that followed, at least three additional United States
Courts of Appeals subsequently adopted the Crooker interpretation of
Exemption 2." While these circuits broadly applied Exemption 2, other
circuits strictly construed the Exemption to protect only human resource
C.

55. Id. at 369. The "circumvention of agency regulation" language appears to be
primarily concerned with whether public disclosure of requested information would allow
individuals to thwart agency regulations. See Id. at 364.
56. See, e.g., Stokes, 476 F.2d 699; Hawkes, 467 F.2d 787.
57. See, e.g., Kaganove, 856 F.2d 884; Crooker, 670 F.2d 1051; Hardy v. BATF, 631 F.2d
653 (9th Cir. 1980); Caplan v. BATF, 587 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1978).
58. 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
59. Id. at 1074.
60. Id.
61. See Milner v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 575 F.3d 959, 968 (9th Cir. 2009); Massey, 3
F.3d at 623; Kaganove, 856 F.2d at 888-89.
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and employee relations matters from mandatory disclosure.62 Considering the two alternative interpretations of Exemption 2, a different name
developed for each interpretation. The term "Low 2" was coined to
describe the strict construction of Exemption 2; namely, as applying to
human resource and employee relations materials."3 Thus, "Low 2" is
used to protect internal matters of a relatively trivial nature from public
disclosure.64 The term "High 2," on the other hand, was coined to
describe the broadened construction of Exemption 2; namely, as applying
to materials that are predominantly internal and whose disclosure would
risk circumvention of agency regulation." Thus, "High 2" is primarily
concerned that FOIA disclosures not "benefit those attempting to violate
the law and avoid detection." 66
More than three decades after its decision in Rose, the Supreme Court
was summoned to determine the validity of the broadened "High 2"
interpretation of Exemption 2. In Milner v. Department of the Navy,
the Court would finally put to rest the controversy surrounding the scope
of FOIAs Exemption 2.
IV.

COURT's RATIONALE

A.

Justice Kagan-The Majority
Justice Kagan's majority opinion in Milner v. Department of the
Navy68 can be divided into three distinct parts. First, the Court firmly
established the scope of Exemption 2 of the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)" by looking to its statutory language."o Next, the Court
addressed and rejected the Navy's proffered alternative readings of
Exemption 2." Finally, recognizing the strength of the Navy's interest
in protecting certain types of information, the Court emphasized the
existence of various other exemptions the Navy may employ to achieve
its goals of nondisclosure."

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See Cox, 592 F.2d at 462-63; Hawkes, 467 F.2d at 797.
Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1263.
See, e.g., Rose, 425 U.S. at 369-70.
Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1263.
Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1053.
131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011).
131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011).
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (2006).
Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1264-66.
Id. at 1266-70.
Id. at 1270-71.
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In Milner,the majority initially focused its consideration of Exemption
2's scope by focusing on the exemption's text: "related solely to the
internal personnel rules and practices of an agency."" After declaring
the key word marking the boundaries of the exemption to be "personnel,"
the Court determined that, when used as an adjective to modify "rules
and practices," the term most logically refers to human resource
matters." Quoting the discussion of FOIA's Exemption 6 in Department of the Air Force v. Rose," the Court provided an example of the
common and congressional meaning of "personnel".7 ' According to the
Court, a "personnel file is the file showing, for example, where [an
employee] was born, the names of his parents, where he has lived from
time to time, his . . . school records, results of examinations, [and]
evaluations of his work performance," and is typically maintained in the
human resources office.78 Exemption 2, the Court explained, uses
"personnel" the same way-"an agency's 'personnel rules and practices'
are its rules and practices dealing with employee relations or human
resources."" Reinforcing its statutory interpretation, the Court noted
that this construction of Exemption 2's language is supported by the
FOIA's philosophy of broad disclosure and the narrow reach Congress
intended its statutory exemptions to maintain.o Pursuant to the plain
meaning of the text, the Court concluded that Exemption 2 does not
protect the ESQD information from disclosure because the information
concerns the physical rules governing explosives and the handling of
dangerous materials, rather than workplace rules governing sailors or
treatment of employees."
After defining the scope of Exemption 2, the majority addressed two
alternative readings of the exemption that were offered by the Navy to
support withholding the Explosive Safety Quantity Distance (ESQD)
First, the majority considered the Navy's suggestion
information.

that the Court adopt the Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco &
Firearms' construction of Exemption 2.8

The Court quickly dis-

73. Id. at 1264; 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2).
74. Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1264.
75. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2006) (protecting "personnel and medical files" from mandatory
disclosure).
76. 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
77. Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1265 (quoting Rose, 425 U.S. at 377).
78. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rose, 425 U.S. at 377).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1265-66.
81. Id. at 1266.
82. Id. at 1266-68.
83. 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

1428

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

pelled any hope of adopting the Crooker interpretation, stating that such
interpretation is completely disconnected from Exemption 2's text in that
the interpretation ignores the plain meaning of "personnel" and adopts
a circumvention requirement that has no basis in the language of the
exemption." Further illustrating its point, the Court proclaimed that
"the only way to arrive at High 2 is by taking a red pen to the statute-cutting out some words and pasting in others until little of the
actual provision remains.n86
After its initial refusal to adopt Crooker, the Court considered the
Navy's arguments that both the legislative history of Exemption 2 and
Congress's subsequent action in amending the FOIA in 1986 supported
the adoption of the Crooker formulation. Noting that the Navy relied
heavily on the legislative history of Exemption 2 to advocate the Crooker
interpretation, the Court reiterated the common rule that legislative
history is used by courts to clear statutory ambiguity, not create it."
Because the House and Senate Reports were squarely at odds in regards
to Exemption 2, the Court declared that clear statutory language trumps
dueling committee reports.89 The Court also went on to reject the
Navy's argument that Congress's 1986 amendment to FOIA's Exemption
7(E)? ratified Crooker, stating that the decision to amend Exemption
7(E), rather than Exemption 2, suggests that Congress approved the
"circumvention" language only as to law enforcement materials.9 ' The
final nail in the Crooker coffin was hammered in by the Court's rebuttal
of Justice Breyer's assertion that Crooker has been consistently relied
upon and followed by lower courts for thirty years.92 Declaring that the
Crooker following is not as prolific as proclaimed by the dissent, the
Court stated that it would not ignore the rules of statutory interpretation to take the side of a "bare majority" of jurisdictions."
Next, the Court addressed the Navy's argument for adoption of a
"clean slate" approach to Exemption 2 based on its text, which would
"encompass [ records concerning an agency's internal rules and practices
for its personnel to follow in the discharge of their governmental

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1266.
Id. at 1267.
Id. (quoting Elliot v. Dep't of Agric., 596 F.3d 842, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
Id. at 1267-68.
Id. at 1267.
Id.
5 U.S.C. § 552(bX7)(E) (2006).
Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1267-68.
Id. at 1268.
Id. at 1269.
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functions."' Declaring that such a construction would strip the word
"personnel" of any real meaning and produce a sweeping exemption, the
Court rejected the Navy's argument under the contention that such a
reading would pose "the risk that FOIA would become less a disclosure
The Court finally noted that the clean
than a withholding statute."
slate interpretation has no basis in the text of Exemption 2 and would
96
violate the rule favoring a narrow construction of FOIA exemptions.
Explicitly recognizing the strength of the Navy's interest in protecting
the ESQD information, the Court concluded by noting that the Navy has
other tools at hand to protect such materials." Specifically, the Court
pointed to FOIA's Exemptions 1,' 3,99 and 710 as possible means for
shielding the ESQD information at issue. 0 ' As a final suggestion, the
Court stated that if the Navy were unable to procure protection of
sensitive information under any of FOIA's exemptions, then it could seek
relief from Congress. 10 2
The majority ultimately concluded that, consistent with the plain
meaning of "personnel rules and practices," Exemption 2 encompasses
only records relating to employee relations and human resources
issues.o Holding that the ESQD information at issue does not qualify
for withholding under the exemption, the Court reversed the court of
appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with
its opinion.'
B. Justice Alito-The Concurrence
Justice Alito concurred with the majority, writing separately to
highlight the Navy's alternative argument raised below that the ESQD
information is shielded from mandatory disclosure by Exemption
7(F).os Noting that this exemption will remain open to the Navy on
remand, Justice Alito discussed Exemption 7 at length before concluding

94. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id. at 1270 (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1270-71.
98. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2006) (preventing access to classified documents).
99. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2006) (shielding records that any other statute exempts from
disclosure).
100. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2006) (protecting information compiled for law enforcement
purposes).
101. Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1271.
102. Id.
103. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1271-72 (Alito, J., concurring).
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that, if the Navy is able to satisfy the threshold requirement that
information be compiled for law enforcement purposes, the ESQD
information may fall within the ambit of Exemption 7(F).1 16
Justice Breyer-The Dissent
Citing Justice Stevens for the proposition that a statute can acquire
a clear meaning that the Court should not disturb, Justice Breyer's
dissent advocated accepting the decision in Crooker as properly stating
the scope of Exemption 2.107 Justice Breyer's dissent highlighted his
opinion that Crooker has been followed or favorably cited by every court
of appeals that considered the matter over the past thirty years, and
that, as such, the Supreme Court should not upset the well-established
interpretation of Exemption 2.10
In addition to Exemption 2's long-standing precedent, Justice Breyer
listed another reason for advocating Crooker's construction of Exemption
2, namely, that the D.C. Circuit undertook a careful analysis of the law
surrounding the exemption and disseminated a reasonable holding
After pointing out that the court in Crooker
concerning its scope.'
examined the language of Exemption 2, legislative history, and
precedent, Justice Breyer highlighted the fact that the statutory
language could be read more broadly to encompass internal rules and
practices that set forth guidelines for agency personnel to follow.'10
Justice Breyer also underscored the fact that the court in Crooker
thought the House and Senate Reports were reconcilable if both sets of
examples were construed as referring to internal staff information that
the public had no legitimate interest in learning about."1 ' Careful not
to ignore its adherence to precedent, Justice Breyer acknowledged the
fact that the Crooker approach was based on a prior opinion by Circuit
Judge Leventhal, as well as language used in Rose. 2
To round out his dissent, Justice Breyer criticized the majority's
acknowledgment that "considerable adjustments" may be necessary in
light of its opinion and further posited the question of how such
adjustments are to be made."' In his view, "it is for the courts,
C.

106. Id. at 1271-73.
107. Id. at 1273-74 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 268 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 1274.
Id. at 1275.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1277.
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through appropriate interpretation, to turn Congress' public information
objectives into workable agency practice, and to adhere to such
interpretations once they are settled." 14
V.

IMPLICATIONS

As the Court noted, the decision in Milner v. Department of the
Navyns will likely "force considerable adjustments" upon government
agencies having previously relied on "High 2" to protect certain types of
sensitive information. 116 While the full nature and extent of such
adjustments will vary depending on the agency, certain considerations
will impact all agencies confronted with Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)"' requests. First, when seeking the protection of Exemption
2,118 agencies must now carefully scrutinize records to determine
whether the information sought falls within the ambit of the exemption's
strictly construed language. Second, since Exemption 2 may no longer
be used as the FOIA catch all, agencies will be compelled to creatively
characterize requested information and seek out the protection of other
existing exemptions. Finally, agencies must consider imploring Congress
to adopt an "Exemption 10" to protect documents deemed inappropriate
for public dissemination but not otherwise qualified for withholding
under the current FOIA exemptions.
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Milner, in May 2011, the
United States Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of Information Policy
(OIP) issued an "OIP Guidance"" 9 for agencies regarding the utilization of Exemption 2.120 The OIP Guidance, among other things,

114. Id. at 1278.
115. 131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011).
116. Id at 1271.
117. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006), amended by OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-175, 121 Stat. 2524.
118. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2).
119.
In keeping with its statutory authority to encourage agency compliance with the
FOIA, OIP regularly develops and issues policy guidance to all agencies on proper
implementation of the FOIA. In addition, OIP issues guidance on a wide range
of legal and procedural issues involving the FOIA to improve administration of the
law, to promote best practices, and to increase transparency.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, OIP Guidance, JusTCE.Gov, http://www.justice.gov/oip/oipguid
ance.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
120. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OIP GUIDANCE, EXEMPTION 2 AFTER THE SUPREME

COURT's RULING IN MILNER V. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAvy (May 10, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/oip/foiapost/milner-navy.pdf [hereinafter OIP GUIDANCE]; see also
OIP Issues Guidance on Exemption 2, FOIA.Gov (May 10, 2011), http://www.foia.gov/2011
foiapostl6.html. The OIP also provided two training sessions on Exemption 2 in the wake
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discusses the new parameters of the exemption and possible alternatives
for agency withholding under other existing exemptions.12' This
resource could be of paramount importance to agencies seeking to
navigate the narrow channels of Exemption 2 considering the guidance
is intended to "serve as a starting point for agencies to work through
[Milner's] many implications [on] their FOIA-processing efforts."'22
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Court's focus on and construction of
Exemption 2's text severely limits the types of records that are now
protected under the ambit of the exemption. Now, in order to qualify for
withholding under Exemption 2, information must relate to an agency's
personnel rules and practices as opposed to rules and practices written
for personnel. 2 ' Moreover, information must be related "solely,"
meaning "exclusively or only," to the personnel rules and practices in
order to be protected under Exemption 2.124 Finally, information must
be "'internal,' meaning that
'the agency must typically keep the records
25
to itself for its own use."',
Further restricting the boundaries of Exemption 2 is the fact that the
current statutory construction must also be read in tandem with the
Supreme Court's previous decision in Department of the Air Force v.
Rose.'26 Even though certain records may, on their face, appear to be
protected under Exemption 2, an agency must still inquire as to whether
there is a "genuine and significant public interest in disclosure.""'
"When there is a genuine and significant public interest in disclosure,
the material falls outside of Exemption 2 as that interest would preclude
it from satisfying the requirements of Exemption 2 that it relate 'solely'
to the 'internal' personnel rules and practices of the agency."128
Prior to the Court's decision in Milner, Exemption 2 was commonly
used to support agency withholding of sensitive information. In 2010,
Exemption 2 was cited as a reason for agency withholding in approxi-

of the Supreme Court's decision in Milner. U.S. Dep't of Justice, OIP TrainingSessions on
Exemption 2AfterMilner,JUSTICE.GOV (Aug. 2011), http:www.justice.gov/oip/foiapost/2011
foiapostl7.html.
121.

See OIP GUIDANCE, supra note 119.

122. Id. at 15.
123. Id. at 6.
124. Id. at 7.
125. Id. (quoting Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1265 n.4).
126. 425 U.S. 352 (1976). In Rose, the Court declared that Exemption 2 does not apply
to information "subject to . .. a genuine and significant public interest" and stated it was
this public interest that differentiated the information at issue "from matters of daily
routine like working hours, which, in the words of Exemption Two, do relate 'Solely to the
internal personnel rules and practices of any agency."' Id. at 368-69.
127. OPI GUIDANCE, supra note 119, at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
128.

Id.
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mately 54,000 of the approximately 80,000 instances where a FOIA
However, considering Exemption 2's new
request was denied."'
limited scope, it is unlikely that use of the exemption will be as prolific
in the future. A more probable forecast is that agencies will begin
utilizing other existing exemptions to a greater extent.
While agencies may look to any of the FOIA's other eight existing
exemptions to protect information previously shielded from disclosure
under Exemption 2, the OIP guidance and the Milner Court both point
specifically to Exemptions 1, 3, and 7 as possible alternatives to justify
withholding sensitive records.13 0 Exemption 1 to FOIA's mandatory
disclosure policy allows an agency to withhold information "specifically
authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept
secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy" when such
information is "in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive
order."13' In order to properly classify a document, an agency must
determine that the information's release "reasonably could be expected
to result in damage to the national security.""' Because many FOIA
requests seek information ultimately withheld as a potential threat to
national security, Exemption 1 could possibly be viewed by agencies as
a quick fix to safeguard sensitive records.
Exemption 3 protects information "specifically exempted from
disclosure by statute" if the statute completely bars public disclosure or
"establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular
types of matters to be withheld.")33 If the statute was enacted after
the OPEN FOIA Act of 2009,"3' then the statute must specifically
reference FOIA's Exemption 3 in order for documents to qualify for
withholding under Exemption 3. 3' In the wake of the Milner decision,

129. Mark Caramanica, Demise of FOIA "High 2" Exemption Debated, REPORTERS
COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.rcfp.org/node/98257.
130. OIP GUIDANCE, supra note 119, at 9.
131. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
132. OPI GUIDANCE, supra note 119, at 10; Exec. Order 13,526, 32 C.F.R. § 2001.10
(2010). Categories of information that can be considered for classification include, but are
not limited to,
military plans, weapons systems, or operations; foreign government information
or foreign relations or activities; intelligence activities or sources or methods;
scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;
programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; vulnerabilities or
capabilities of systems, or infrastructures related to national security; or
development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruction.
Id.; Exec. Order 13,526, 32 C.F.R. § 2001.21(3) (2010).
133. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).
134. Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2184 (2009).
135. OIP GUIDANCE, supra note 119, at 11.
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it should not be surprising to see an influx of Exemption 3 statutory
proposals. For example, the 2012 Defense Authorization Bill, which was
proposed and passed by the House of Representatives after the Court's
decision in Milner, contains a provision that would require withholding
of information relating to military infrastructure.'a
FOIA's Exemption 7 protects "records or information compiled for law
Subsections (E) and (F) may be particularly
enforcement purposes."'
applicable to information no longer qualifying for protection under
Exemption 2. Exemption 7(E) applies when the release of such
information "would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law
enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could
Exempreasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law."'
be
reasonably
"could
information
tion 7(F) applies if disclosure of the
individual."'
any
of
expected to endanger the life or physical safety
Thus, as long as a document was compiled for law enforcement purposes,
Exemption 7 may extend to protect some agency information previously
shielded under the broad interpretation of Exemption 2.
With the narrowed scope of Exemption 2 comes the broadening of the
potential range and quantity of information that must be disclosed under
FOIA. While the other existing exemptions discussed above may allow
agencies to withhold certain categories of information, it is inevitable
that other types of information will no longer have a statutory basis for
protection. Quite possibly, the most "practical effect of [the Court's]
ruling will be to leave unprotected a great deal of information that could
threaten the public safety if disclosed." 4 0 With concerns such as this
lingering in the background of the Milner decision, perhaps the most
appropriate option for agencies facing the challenge of protecting
information without a basis for protection would be to beseech Congress
to adopt an "Exemption 10." While suggestions for the potential content
of such an exemption is best left to be debated by agencies and
congressmen, the Supreme Court's opinion makes one fact readily
apparent: if Congress "has not enacted the FOIA exemption the
Government desires" then the Court will "leave to Congress, as is
appropriate, the question whether it should do so."' 4 ' The Court will

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

H.R. 1540, 112th Cong. § 1091 (2011).
5 U.S.C. § 552(bX7).
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E).
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F).
Leading Cases, 125 HARv. L. REV. 341, 341-42 (2011).
Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1271.
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not substitute the judiciaries "odd inventions" for the legislature's "true
rules" it deems explicitly found in statutory text.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In Milner v. Department of the Navy,'42 the Supreme Court conclusively ended a decades-long dispute revolving around the scope of FOIA's
Narrowly construing its plain language, the Court
Exemption 2."
concluded that Exemption 2 only encompasses records relating to
employee relations and human resources issues and does not extend to
more substantial internal matters whose disclosure would risk circumvention of the law.'" While the full effect of the Court's strict construction of Exemption 2 will only be seen over time and developed
pursuant to any subsequent congressional action, one implication of the
Court's decision appears unavoidable: Milner will have a significant
impact on federal agencies that previously relied on Exemption 2 to
withhold sensitive information.
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